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Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities
(PAEs)
†

††

Christopher A. Cotropia , Jay P. Kesan & David
†††
L. Schwartz
In the last decade, the landscape of patent litigation has
radically shifted. Entities that do not manufacture products
have become important players in the patent litigation system.
This is a change from years ago, when patent litigation was
1
dominated by lawsuits between competitors. In this earlier period, there were complaints that the cost of patent litigation
prohibited most small patent owners from enforcing their
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1. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings:
Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1571 (2009) (describing various plaintiff-defendant matchups and their
frequency of occurrence in patent litigation).
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rights against large entities. Today, companies that manufacture products embodying their patents urge that patent plaintiffs that do not manufacture products are fundamentally different. The main argument is that there are asymmetric
2
stakes. In a patent lawsuit when both plaintiffs and defendants are manufacturers, defendants can cross-license patents
or hit back at plaintiffs with their own patent infringement
lawsuit, a strategy that is unavailable with a nonmanufacturing plaintiff. As a result, non-manufacturing plaintiffs in the patent system are seen as opportunistic actors who
sue manufacturing companies for money.
The recent entrants, often-called “patent assertion entities”
3
(“PAEs”), non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), patent monetiza4
tion entities (“PMEs”), or simply patent trolls, come in many
shapes and sizes. They run the gamut from universities, failed
start-ups, and individual inventors, to companies formed by
5
venture capitalists seeking to exploit the inventions of others.
From the perspective of a patent as an economic instrument
designed to provide rewards for inventors, it is important to
carefully separate these specific categories of PAEs. There is
little economic support for the proposition that individual inventors and university personnel should not benefit from the
6
patent system. Similarly, start-up companies that subsequently fail to commercialize their patented technologies also urge
that they should be allowed to monetize their patents through
litigation when other companies deploy the start-up’s patented
7
technologies in their products. Other entities in the patent system who help individuals, universities, and failed start-ups
monetize their patents also urge that they are important intermediaries bringing resources to inventors to help them mon2. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the
Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2162 (2013).
3. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
297, 300 (2010).
4. Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents
Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2012).
5. Some studies have attempted to classify parties using a dozen entity
status categories. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker,
Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009).
6. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S.
INNOVATION 2 (2013) [hereinafter “EXECUTIVE OFFICE REPORT”].
7. See id. at 3.
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8

etize their patents. We recognize that there are various names
9
that people use to refer to these entities. In this Article, we refer to all of these entities as PAEs, except when referring to the
studies of others who call them by a different name.
Most recently, there has been a ferocious backlash in many
sectors of society against PAEs. Some academics and practitioners have argued forcefully that PAEs are bad, that their
conduct is costly, and that they are socially harmful to the
10
economy. The President of the United States has even joined
in the fray. In response to a question about “patent trolls,”
President Obama recently stated, “They don’t actually produce
anything themselves . . . . They are essentially trying to leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort
11
some money out of them.” To counter patent trolls, the President and his economic team issued an executive order, including some legislative recommendations, to make litigation more
12
difficult for patent holders. Academics have contended that
PAEs cost the economy tens of billions of dollars, based upon a
13
confidential survey of defendants. The press trumpeted an-

8. See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, Competition Law & Patent Assertion
Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do (June 20, 2013) available at
http://ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/130620paespeech.pdf (“Rewarding genuine invention is good for competition and consumers. PAEs can serve that goal by
reducing the enforcement hurdles facing small inventors and start-ups . . . .
PAEs can make it easier for a failed start-up to monetize its patents, providing
some insurance for venture capitalists.”).
9. Some refer to all or some NPEs as “trolls.” For instance, some believe
troll refers to a case brought by an NPE which is meritless. Others believe
troll refers to a case brought by an NPE for a nuisance value settlement. Others believe that all cases brought by an NPE are troll cases, regardless of the
merits. While the terms PME and PAE are meant to exclude University patent
litigation, it is less clear whether Individual Inventor lawsuits are included.
For an empirical project such as ours, the definition of an NPE is key.
10. See Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 129 (2010). See generally James Bessen & Michael Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014) (discussing the costs of patent litigation).
11. Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls To Protect American Innovation, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-protect-american-innovation.
12. See Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators To Root Out “Patent
Trolls,” N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/
business/president-moves-to-curb-patent-suits.html; EXECUTIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6 (discussing data findings regarding PAE litigation).
13. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10, at 389. For a critique of the methods
used in that study, see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role
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other study that found patent trolls filed 62% of patent law14
suits in 2012, a huge increase from the 29% filed in 2010. RPX
Corporation (RPX) and Patent Freedom, two companies whose
business includes providing subscriptions for businesses facing
PAE assertions of patent infringement, have each reported
15
summaries of their proprietary data on PAEs.
While the rhetoric in these studies is often sharp and clear,
the same cannot also be said for the disclosures of the underlying data. The studies merely provide summary data to the public and often do not differentiate between the various types of
PAEs. Instead, the studies broadly classify companies as either
PAEs or non-PAEs (or sometimes, trolls or non-trolls). Importantly, nearly all of the data upon which these studies are
premised is confidential and thus is not available for peer re16
view or for use in other studies. This includes the data used in
the Executive Office Report. In late August 2013, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) released its long-awaited
17
report on NPEs. That report, while appearing quite balanced
of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425
(2014).
14. See Steven Musil, Patent Trolls Now Behind Most Patent Infringement
Lawsuits, CNET (Dec. 10, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3
-57558384-93/patent-trolls-now-behind-most-patent-infringement-lawsuits
(“About 62 percent of all patent lawsuits filed this year up to December 1 were
brought by patent assertion entities (PAEs), which are created to extract licensing fees from other companies rather than make products based on the
patents.”); Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, PATENTLY-O (Mar.
14, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html.
15. See, e.g., RPX CORP., 2012 NPE ACTIVITY REPORT (2013), available at
http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2013/07/0BF995E82CFF591EE80EFE8AC692
59E7.pdf. Patent Freedom’s publicly available website contains summary data
on NPE assertions. See, e.g., Litigations Over Time, PATENT FREEDOM,
https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2014). Moreover, Steven J. Moore, a legal practitioner at the Kelley Drye law
firm, wrote a five-part series on the popular blog IPWatchdog about NPEs. In
the posts, he reported summary data on a variety of NPE related issues that
appear to contradict the anti-patent troll narrative. See, e.g., Steve Moore,
Probing 10 Patent Troll Myths—A Fractured Fairytale Part 2, IPWATCHDOG
(July 30, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/30/probing-10
-patent-troll-myths-a-factured-fairytale-part-2/id=43754.
16. We understand that Stanford Law School is in the early staging of organizing a publicly available database of litigated patent owner information,
including classification of entities that own the underlying patents. We have
agreed to contribute our data to this worthwhile effort. We understand that
some or all of the data from the Feldman et al. article will also be contributed
to the public database.
17. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD
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and thoughtful, has several shortcomings. The GAO analyzed
data from patent lawsuits initiated between 2007 and 2011,
which means that it lacked meaningful data after the effective
18
date, in late 2011, of the America Invents Act. The GAO report also did not disclose its underlying data. Because the underlying data is never released in any of the prior studies, other
researchers cannot often determine which entities were classified as PAEs or NPEs, what revenue numbers were associated
with these entities, and other information necessary to fully
evaluate the claims. This information is critical to verify, as a
policy matter, whether PAEs are engaging in strategic and op19
portunistic behavior that does not benefit anyone except them.
Defenders of PAEs have offered several purported benefits.
They claim that PAEs provide liquidity in the marketplace for
20
patents. They permit inventors who are otherwise excluded
from the marketplace—because, for instance, they are individuals who cannot manufacture products, or they are companies
that tried yet failed to manufacture—to obtain some return on
21
their investment. Even when these entities sell their patents
to another to enforce, they are receiving something for their efforts. According to this argument, without the market for patents, these inventors would remain uncompensated for their
contributions. Furthermore, PAEs are claimed to be specialists
in patent enforcement who are skilled in evaluating allegations
of infringement and hiring and supervising law firms to keep
costs down. PAEs also have resources to cover litigation ex22
penses. Under this theory, PAEs assert lawsuits that have a
reasonable likelihood of succeeding and which are expected to
yield recoveries above out-of-pocket litigation expenses.
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY (2013) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf.
18. Id. at 4. The GAO Report hypothesizes without data that the increase
in litigation in the end of 2011 was because patent owners anticipated the passage of the AIA, which restricted the number of accused infringers who could
be joined in a single lawsuit. Id. at 15.
19. We also note that lawsuits do not represent the complete story of patent disputes. Some disputes are clearly raised and either settled or dropped
without court intervention. We have no means to evaluate the quantity or effect of cease and desist letters sent by patent holders, despite their potential
importance. This correspondence between private parties is confidential and
not available to research in all but the rarest of circumstances.
20. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459
(2012); Shrestha, supra note 10, at 126–28.
21. See sources cited supra note 20.
22. Risch, supra note 20, at 494.
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To us, the fundamental barrier to thoroughly understanding these competing narratives is the lack of granular and
transparent data that attempts to properly account for the various types of PAEs. In addition, no other PAE study, to our
knowledge, has publicly released the underlying data. Other
studies maintain their datasets as confidential or otherwise
23
have not yet released the data. This present study overcomes
this barrier.
We have classified all patent holder litigants from calendar
years 2010 and 2012, and we are releasing this data to the public. We have attempted to drill down and finely classify the nature of the litigants, beyond the simple PAE or non-PAE definitions. Broad definitions of trolls or PAEs surely cause higher
numbers. We believe that providing data to the public that unpacks the definition of PAE can provide better illumination to
policy makers, researchers, and others interested in the patent
litigation system. It will enable researchers to properly tailor
investigations to the specific question they are considering. And
if one believes that all PAEs, however defined, are bad, then
one can aggregate our classifications to analyze data.
Our dataset, which took months to gather and code, includes 2,520 lawsuits from 2010 and 5,185 lawsuits from 2012.
We classified each patent holder as an Operating Company,
University, Individual Inventor, Patent Aggregator, Technology
Development Company, Failed Start-up, IP Holding Subsidiary
24
of an Operating Company, or Patent Holding Company. In
addition, we obtained information about the underlying patents
and technologies involved in the lawsuits.
Our data provides a rich account of changes in patent litigation in the last few years, considering both the increase in
the number of patent lawsuits and their interaction with the
new laws that have come into effect under the America Invents
Act (AIA). Our most basic descriptive findings are inconsistent
with, and call into serious question, the summary data provided by RPX, Patent Freedom, and other academics. Our data reveals a much lower percentage of litigation brought by Patent
23. Some of the data is owned by RPX and Patent Freedom. These are forprofit businesses that earn money, in part, because of the data that they have
compiled. We understand their legitimate business desire to maintain the data
as secret. However, if a business elects to maintain its data as secret, then we
believe the data should be severely discounted in debates about public policy.
As academics, we do not have these financial incentives with respect to data.
24. A full description of each of these types of patent holders is found in
Part II.
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Holding Companies than other studies. In fact, for the most
part, we find that there has not been any explosion of PAE litigation between 2010 and 2012, as others have reported. We
find, instead, that most of the differences between the years are
likely explained by, and attributable to, a change in the joinder
rules adopted in 2011 as part of the America Invents Act. To be
sure, the data is slightly complicated, and we do find a modest
increase in PAE litigation, especially if one uses a narrow definition of PAEs (including only non-original inventors—Patent
Holding Companies and Patent Aggregators). But overall, the
often-repeated “explosion” of PAE litigation from 2010 to 2012
is almost completely a myth.
Our data reveals a modest increase in the number of Patent Holding Companies and in the number of Individual Inventor suits. We also find that when we repackage all PAEs into a single category, they are responsible for a majority of
accused infringers sued for patent infringement in 2012. We
note that many of the patent law changes currently proposed
will negatively impact Individual Inventors. Individual Inventors are rarely explicitly described as trolls but are often included in the counts of ‘bad’ lawsuits. If one believes that the
focus should be on speculators who purchase patents from others for the purposes of enforcement, then the data on such individuals should be studied.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. In
Part I, we explain several theories on why PAEs are beneficial
or detrimental to the patent system. These theories outline distinct categories of patent holders who enforce their patents.
Transforming the distinct categories into a coding scheme, we
detail in Part II the methodology we used to generate the dataset. Part III provides descriptive statistics of 2010 and 2012
patent litigation. We discuss implications of the data, including
points of disagreement between our data and the data of others, in Part IV. We also describe some areas of future study,
many of which we are presently undertaking. Finally, we provide a brief conclusion.
I. THEORIES RELATING TO PAES
There are numerous theories on the role of PAEs in the patent system. As mentioned in the introduction, many people
(including President Obama’s economic team) contend that
PAEs “significantly retard innovation in the United States and
result in economic ‘dead weight loss’ in the form of reduced in-
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novation, income, and jobs for the American economy.” They
assert that PAEs hold up legitimate innovators by demanding
undeserved rents. Opponents of PAEs point to other “unfair”
aspects of PAE litigation that stem from the fact that PAEs do
not manufacture any products. For instance, PAEs are immune
from a potential weapon used by accused infringers—
counterclaims of patent infringement—because they make no
26
products that may potentially infringe a patent. Furthermore,
because PAEs do not manufacture products, they have fewer
27
relevant documents. In litigation, the discovery obligations
are asymmetric, with it costing more to defend a PAE lawsuit
28
than to prosecute one. Supporters of PAEs allege that these
entities serve a useful role as intermediaries with skills at
monetizing patents, something that many original patent own29
ers lack. But sometimes, the arguments are more nuanced. To
untangle these conflicting economic rationales and dueling narratives, the definition of PAE needs to be unpacked and the
specific categories of actors within the PAE category and each
actor’s behavior in litigation needs to be analyzed separately.
An initial question is whether Universities should be included within a definition of PAE. University faculty and graduate students are often viewed as important contributors to innovation and scientific research. However, Universities are
undeniably “non-practicing”; they do not directly commercialize
their inventions. A technical definition of PAE or NPE would
include Universities, although many scholars believe Universi30
ties should not be included.
Moving beyond Universities, should Individual Inventors
enforcing their own patents be considered PAEs? Again, these
individuals are non-practicing in that they are not manufacturing products. Some consider them bad actors and “patent
31
trolls.” But the story of the garage inventor, “working against

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
See id. at 4.
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2162.
See id.
Risch, supra note 20, at 459.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008) (arguing that universities should not be deemed trolls); Risch, supra note 20, at 468.
31. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in
Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 173 (2007) (“In
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all odds to provide society with amazing technological break32
throughs” is part of the American dream. And if an important
benefit of PAEs is their roles as intermediaries skilled at monetizing patents, it is strange to include the original individual
patent inventors, who are by definition not intermediaries.
Failed companies, including Failed Start-ups and Failed
Operating Companies, also are a distinct type of PAE. At one
point, these companies either manufactured products or seriously attempted to break into the market. For some reason,
these entities failed at selling or developing products or services. They retained their original patents, and later seek to enforce them. To proponents of PAEs and entrepreneurship in
general, Failed Start-ups that enforce their patents are a posi33
tive. The revenue from patent monetization permits some return to the original corporate backers and investors, who oth34
erwise would receive no money. By providing an alternative
method of returning money to investors, patent enforcement
35
helps the investment ecosystem. Critics of PAEs argue that
very few start-ups plan or ever make money from enforcing
36
their patents. They argue that start-ups are more likely to be
37
on the receiving, rather than asserting, end of a PAE dispute.
Another category includes companies that develop technology largely for the purposes of licensing to others. These companies are like idea labs, which rely upon patents to protect the
inventions. They are separate from Individual Inventors because they use a corporate structure to bring together numerous employee inventors. But they are original owners of the
technology, and for the most part they do not practice the technology by making products and/or offering services based on
contrast, the so-called patent trolls are often individual inventors or small
startups.”).
32. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of
the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 54 (2009).
33. Risch, supra note 20, at 491.
34. Id.
35. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009) (analyzing a survey of early-stage technology companies regarding why they patent).
36. See generally COLLEEN V. CHIEN, NEW AM. FOUND., PATENT ASSERTION AND STARTUP INNOVATION (2013), available at http://newamerica.net/
sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Patent%20Assertion%20and%20Startup
%20Innovation_updated.pdf (discussing benefits and costs of patent assertion
litigation to start-up companies and venture capitalists).
37. Id.
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their patented technologies. These Technology Development
Companies fit as PAEs in some definitions, but not others.
Some definitions of PAEs exclude the original owner of the
patents. The argument is that financial speculators are purchasing patents not with the goal of enhancing knowledge or
encouraging commercialization, but rather merely to obtain financial returns (i.e., rent-seeking). Others counter that these
speculators are creating a market for patents to enable Individual Inventors to receive some compensation, when none was
38
previously available. These financial speculators, presumably
financed by Wall Street, take two potential forms. First, they
may purchase a single patent or small portfolio of patents. These speculators form essentially a shell corporation—a Patent
Holding Company—to hold title to the patents without other
substantial assets. Then, the Patent Holding Company aggressively asserts the patents against an industry. The Patent
Holding Company’s legal fees are relatively low in patent litiga39
tion because it has essentially no documents to produce. Consequently, its discovery costs are low. Moreover, the Patent
Holding Company litigates overly aggressively because it has
no reputational concerns that an Operating Company may have
40
when asserting its patents.
A second type of speculator is the Mass or Large Patent
Aggregator. The Mass Patent Aggregator acquires a large portfolio of patents, sometimes alleged to be as large as 80,000 pa41
tents. Aggregators then assert the entire portfolio against established industry participants. Critics of these entities claim
that they are a tax on production, unnecessarily raise rivals’
42
costs, and engage in potential anticompetitive conduct. Others
tepidly defend Mass Aggregators by arguing that Aggregators
reduce transaction costs for companies needing to clear a signif43
icant number of patent rights. According to this narrative,
38. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 31, at 172–73.
39. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2162.
40. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
41. Dennis Crouch, Intellectual Ventures and its 80,000 Patents, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/10/intellectual
-ventures-and-its-80000-patents.html.
42. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 25–28 (2012).
43. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2157. “Royalty stacking” refers to
situations in which a single product potentially infringes many patents and
thus may require multiple royalty payments. The term “royalty stacking” reflects the fact that, from the perspective of the company making the product in
question, all of the different claims for royalties must be added or “stacked”
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Mass Aggregators reduce the number of negotiations, which in
44
turn reduces “royalty stacking.” Thus, according to theory, the
total payment by those needing licenses would be lower when
negotiating with a Mass Aggregator than when negotiating
45
with numerous smaller Patent Holders.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) opened an investigation into certain PAEs, presumably ones that acquire patents
46
from others. One concern of the FTC is that an insufficient
portion of the recoveries from patent assertions is provided to
the inventors and innovators. Instead, the argument is that the
middlemen—contingent lawyers, venture capitalists, and others—siphon off almost all of the money. Almost none of the
money purportedly returns to the deserving party, the original
inventor. However, the financial arrangements between the
original owner, subsequent owners, their managers, and attorneys are typically confidential and not available for review. As
a result, it is difficult to determine the percentage of the royalty
income that is returned to the original inventors. Nevertheless,
the FTC, through its 6(b) subpoena power, can theoretically obtain this sort of information from the parties that are involved
in these transactions.
The FTC’s concern highlights an important issue in the
study of PAEs: not all of the criticisms in the press apply to all
categories of PAEs. The FTC’s concern pertains only to a subset
of PAEs. It does not apply to Individual Inventors and Failed
Start-ups enforcing their own patents. Those groups obtain all,
or substantially all, of the recoveries from the lawsuits. Other
entities, such as Patent Holding Companies that purchase patents in order to monetize them, fall within the desired criticism that the FTC hopes to investigate. Furthermore, Large
Patent Aggregators fall within the FTC’s concern.
In sum, there are numerous distinct types of patent holders who may assert their rights. These include Universities,
Individual Inventors, Failed Start-ups, Technology Developtogether to determine the total royalty burden that is borne by the product if
the firm is to sell that product without engaging in patent infringement. Id. at
2148.
44. Id. at 2157.
45. Id.
46. See Edward Wyatt, Inventive, at Least in Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2013, at B1 (noting that the FTC “is expected to begin a sweeping investigation” of patent assertion entities that use shell companies when they sue); see
also Ramirez, supra note 8 (“I believe that the Commission should use its 6(b)
authority to study the costs and benefits of PAE activity.”).
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ment Companies, Patent Holding Companies, Mass Patent Aggregators, as well as Operating Companies. The argument
about the costs and benefits of PAEs vary for the different
types of patent holders, with some arguments only being applicable to a subset of all patent holders. In this empirical work,
as we elaborate in the next section, we have kept careful track
of the various types of patent holders and their involvement in
patent litigation in the recent past.
II. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
In this Part, we convert the distinct categories of patent
holders we set forth in Part I into a usable taxonomy of PAEs
for our empirical study. Because the definitions we used are essential to our study, this part explains in detail the techniques
used to collect and classify the data. It then reports some basic
parameters of the data set. We also report various statistical
measures of reliability. To permit others to evaluate our coding
and to use the data for other studies, we have made the data
47
set available at http://www.npedata.com.
A. THE CODERS
Because the data is both central to the article and difficult
48
to code, the authors personally coded all of the lawsuits. We
did not delegate the task to our student RAs. We did not outsource the job to foreigners unfamiliar with patents and the
49
U.S. litigation system. Instead, each of the three authors
spent a significant amount of time coding the identities of the
patent holders.
We believe that our previous experience relating to data,
patents, and litigation was an important advantage in coding
the lawsuits. Each of the authors practiced as a patent attorney
before becoming a full time academic. Together, we have over
twenty years’ experience in practicing patent litigation, representing both practicing and non-practicing entities, and over
47. We have released the raw data we obtained from PACER that permits
identification of the case, along with our categorization of the type of entity.
PACER is a federal government-operated service providing access to electronic
court records.
48. As used in this article, we use the term “case” and “lawsuit” interchangeably. Both terms refer to a dispute that was assigned a particular civil
action number by the courts.
49. We do not know who RPX and Patent Freedom rely upon to classify
parties in their database, but we suspect experienced patent litigators are not
personally performing the coding.
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thirty years academic experience in studying patent litigation.
In addition, our collective experience includes serving as legal
and technical experts in patent litigation and presiding over
patent litigation as a special master. We have each separately
conducted empirical studies of patent litigation and previously
50
engaged in large scale coding projects. We believe that our
prior experience adds important validity to our study. Many of
the coding decisions require detailed knowledge of patent litigation and civil procedure, two topics on which student coders
and inexpensive foreign labor would be particularly deficient.
Other coding decisions inherently require some subjective
51
judgment. We believe that our collective experience provides
us substantial value in coding. Furthermore, we have benefitted from reviewing the coding schema used by other academics.
These provide us both with a roadmap of potential coding

50. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009); Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining
Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801 (2010); Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A.
Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES.
POL’Y 844 (2013); Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal
Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
911 (2007); Christopher A. Cotropia, Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster,
Patent Applications and the Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 179 (2013); Christopher A. Cotropia, Strength of the
International Trade Commission As a Patent Venue, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 1 (2011); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237 (2006); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G.
Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court,
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393–467 (2011); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The
Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2009); Jay P.
Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169 (2009); David L.
Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009); David L.
Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1157 (2011); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 223 (2008); David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1073 (2010); Christopher A. Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpretation Review Deference or Correction Driven? (Feb. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
51. We note that the government disagreed with 29 out of 500 classifications made by Lex Machina. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 52 (“We found
29 cases where we differed with Lex Machina’s original classification. They
adjusted their classifications in all but five of the cases.”).
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schema and choices, as well as aspects we thought could be im52
proved.
B. IDENTIFYING RELEVANT LAWSUITS
The data set assembled for the present study includes information from all patent infringement lawsuits filed in two
complete calendar years: 2010 and 2012. The raw data from
these years includes 3,553 and 5,600 lawsuits, respectively. We
wanted two separate years so we could compare them. The year
2010 was well-suited for study because a majority of the lawsuits filed then have since been resolved, thus permitting us to
investigate outcomes, settlements, and other information relating to the litigation. The year 2012 provides a more recent
snapshot.
The year 2011 was poorly suited for empirical study, in our
opinion, because the America Invents Act (“AIA”) was adopted
53
in September of that year. The AIA included a revision to the
joinder rules for patent litigation, which requires lawsuits filed
54
against multiple unrelated parties to be filed separately. For
example, in 2010, while you could sue three defendants in one
patent lawsuit in some venues, after the passage of the AIA,
you may have to sue each defendant separately, resulting in
three patent lawsuits. After the negotiated language of the AIA
was released to the public and before the President signed it into law, there appeared to be a rush to the courthouse to file be55
fore the new rules were effective. Indeed, in those few days in
September, over 800 defendants were sued for patent infringe56
ment. Because of both the change of law that occurred during
the year and the uncommon spike in filings before the adoption
of the AIA, we chose to exclude 2011. We suspect that many of
the cases filed in September 2011 would have otherwise been
brought later in 2011, and that some of them may have been
filed in 2012 (or not filed at all). We do not believe that the Sep52. See, e.g., Jeruss et al., supra note 4, at 364–72; Robin Feldman, Tom
Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall 2013, at 1, 16–37, available at
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2013/041024-Feldman.pdf.
53. Act of Sept. 16, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
54. See id. § 299 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012)).
55. Dennis Crouch, Rush to Judgment: New Dis-Joinder Rules and NonPracticing Entities, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.patentlyo
.com/patent/2011/09/rush-to-judgment-new-dis-joinder-rules-and-nonpracticing-entities.html.
56. Id.
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tember 2011 spike substantially affects our results from 2012
57
and some data supports our belief, but at this point, we cannot
58
rule it out.
We do not believe that parties in 2010 anticipated the passage of the AIA, particularly the joinder provision. Patent reform bills had been introduced in Congress every year since
59
2005, becoming progressively more watered down each year.
There was no indication or expectation that a bill would ever
60
pass. Furthermore, the joinder provision of the AIA was not
present in the patent reform bills under debate in 2010 or ear61
lier. In fact, the joinder provision was added to the bill that
became the AIA in a final mark-up before passage, with little
62
notice or debate.
We used Bloomberg Law’s Federal Docket Database to
63
identify the patent lawsuits filed in these years. We under64
stand that Bloomberg Law obtains its data from PACER. As a
check on Bloomberg’s comprehensiveness, we manually compared the results of a search of patent infringement lawsuits

57. We have analyzed the monthly lawsuit filings in January, February,
and March in 2010 and 2012 by entity type. The pattern of filings appears to
be the same, with March being the highest month in both years. We also considered whether January 2012 appeared to be artificially low, at least compared to January 2010, for filings involving patent holding companies. If January 2012 was low, it would be consistent with cases that would be filed in
early 2012 having been accelerated and filed just before the passage of the AIA
in September 2011. After investigating, January 2012 did not appear to be artificially low.
58. To fully consider the spike, one would need to gather and classify the
patent litigation data from 2011 using our coding.
59. See Dan L. Burk, Patent Reform in the United States: Lessons
Learned, REGULATION, Winter 2012–13, at 20, 20.
60. See id.
61. For a summary of the key provisions in the proposed Patent Reform
Act of 2010, see Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 8, 2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reform
-act-of-2010-an-overview.html. Even the patent reform bills introduced earlier
in 2011 did not contain the provision on joinder. See S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011),
available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2011/02/patentreformactof2011
asreported.pdf.
62. David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 655–56
(2013).
63. We limited the docket search on Bloomberg Law to lawsuits from between January 1 and December 31 of the given year. We used the Nature of
Suit field to isolate “830 – Patent” cases.
64. Ask a Librarian: Court Documents and PACER Access, HARV. L. SCH.
LIBR., http://asklib.law.harvard.edu/a.php?qid=39345 (last visited Nov. 5,
2014).
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from Bloomberg with an analogous search from PACER. We
found that the Bloomberg results were over 99% accurate in the
sample we reviewed and, in fact, appeared to capture consolidated matters slightly more accurately than PACER’s raw da66
ta. Consequently, we felt comfortable using Bloomberg’s dataset of patent infringement cases.
For every lawsuit, we reviewed the docket report and a
copy of the complaint. The docket report is a list of the papers
67
filed with, or generated by, the court in the case. It includes
the title and associated date of each entry from the initial com68
plaint until the lawsuit is terminated. The complaint is the le69
gal document that initiates a lawsuit. While the complaint is
frequently light on facts, it sometimes has information about
70
the parties, including the patent holder.
After reviewing these documents, we eliminated several
types of cases from the data set. First, we excluded all cases in
71
which the sole cause of action was patent false marking.
65. We limited our search in PACER to Nature of Suit “830 – Patent” as
we did in Bloomberg Law.
66. We reviewed patent lawsuits initiated between January 1, 2012 and
March 1, 2012 in both databases. There were only 7 inconsistencies in 778 records. These 7 inconsistencies all were from two groups of lawsuits. In the first,
involving Brandeis University, there were a set of cases filed in the Western
District of Wisconsin and Northern District of Illinois between the same parties. Bloomberg Law merges these into a single lawsuit, specifically the one
that was pursued. In the second, PACER has two lawsuits with sequential
docket numbers (9:12-CV-80037 and 9:12-CV-80038) between the same parties
in the same district. Bloomberg Law only includes one of these lawsuits. For
all of these inconsistencies, we believe that Bloomberg Law’s data is better
suited for our purposes than the original PACER data. As discussed in more
detail below, we believe that consolidated cases should not be double counted.
67. See generally Dockets, BLOOMBERG L., http://www.bna.com/
bloomberglaw/dockets/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
68. Id.
69. Complaint, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
complaint/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
70. Id.; see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8–10.
71. False marking disputes are cases in which someone, often a member
of the general public, complains that a company labeled its product as “patented,” when in fact, no unexpired patent covered the product. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 292 (2012). The issues in Patent false marking cases are quite different from
disputes about whether a party infringes a patent. For instance, the validity of
the patent is not at issue in patent false marking cases. See R. Mark
McCareins & Peter Slawniak, Current State of Patent False Marking Litigation, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., May 2011, at 3, 3. Many of the cases involved companies that, without bad intent, continued to mark their products
with a patent number even though the patent had expired. See id. In these
cases, infringement was not at issue either. See id. Furthermore, none of the
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There were 666 patent false marking cases, which we manually
excluded in 2010. The AIA effectively eliminated nearly all
72
false marking cases. We did not find any false marking disputes in the 2012 data.
Second, we excluded all cases in which the only patents asserted were design patents. The current debate about PAEs is
73
about utility patents, not design patents. If a lawsuit involved
allegations of both utility and design patent infringement, we
retained the lawsuit in the data set. Excluding design-patentonly lawsuits resulted in 184 lawsuits being dropped in 2010
and 176 lawsuits being dropped in 2012.
Third, we excluded other cases that did not involve an allegation of infringement of a utility patent. This included allegations of legal malpractice, inventorship disputes (including requests for correction of inventorship), demands for patent term
adjustments, interferences, motions to quash subpoenas, other
actions against the Patent Office, and mislabeled trademark
74
and copyright infringement actions. We excluded 139 lawsuits
on this basis from 2010 and 147 lawsuits from 2012.
Finally, we excluded duplicate cases. Whenever possible,
when cases were consolidated or transferred, we eliminated the
duplicate lawsuit. Although we removed duplicative suits, we
did not automatically remove declaratory judgment actions. If
there were reciprocal declaratory judgment and patent infringement actions involving the same parties and the same patents, we would exclude one of the lawsuits. Unless there was a
current debate about PAEs involves claims about false marking. Consequently, we thought it best to remove these cases from the data set.
72. The America Invents Act eliminated the ability of any member of the
public to initiate a lawsuit alleging false marking. See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2012).
Instead, only the U.S. government and companies that have been competitively injured can initiate false marking lawsuits. Id. Almost none of the false
marking cases brought in 2010 were brought by a company that had been
competitively injured.
73. Design patents are becoming more important in the business context,
but they still are fundamentally different from utility patents. Design patents
contain essentially no text; nearly all of the patent specification and claims
comprise figures of a design. They cover ornamental and decorative aspects of
a design, as opposed to functional aspects. Litigation involving design patents
is much cheaper than utility patent litigation. For instance, the American Intellectual Property Law Association estimates that the cost of design patent
litigation is substantially below utility patent litigation. But again, the current
debate about PAEs is about utility patents, not design patents.
74. These cases are quite distinct from patent infringement lawsuits.
More importantly, they are not part of the debate about PAEs. Thus, we believe that exclusion of these cases is necessary.
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reciprocal lawsuit brought by the patent holder, we retained
declaratory judgment actions in our data set. We understand
that other researchers have systematically eliminated all de75
claratory judgment actions from their data set. We see no reason to exclude declaratory judgment actions, provided that such
lawsuits involved allegations of utility patent infringement and
do not result in a double counting of a dispute between the patentee and the alleged infringer.
After removing the categories of lawsuits identified above,
our dataset contained 2,520 patent infringement lawsuits in
2010 and 5,185 patent infringement lawsuits in 2012. As we
explain in Part III, the difference is largely explained by the
AIA change in joinder rules.
For every lawsuit, we obtained certain specific information
from Bloomberg Law. We obtained the judicial district in which
the lawsuit was brought, the judge assigned to the case, the civil action number, the filing date of the lawsuit, the utility patent numbers asserted in the lawsuit, and a list of all of the
parties to the lawsuit (including all plaintiffs and defendants).
From there, we determined the type of patent holder involved
in the lawsuit.
C. CLASSIFYING PATENT HOLDERS
For each of the patent infringement lawsuits in 2010 and
2012, we classified the patent holder by type of entity. Each of
the authors coded approximately one third of the cases. We intentionally coded overlapping cases so we could gauge the reliability of the coding. When coding, we considered all of the parties involved in asserting patent infringement. When there was
only a single party who owned the patent, it was easy. In these
cases, we focused on the sole patent holder.
However, when there were two or three plaintiffs (or defendants in declaratory judgment actions), our focus was on
who controlled the litigation and litigation strategy. This occurred somewhat infrequently. The most common time it occurred was when a patent owned by an Individual was asserted
in a lawsuit along with an exclusive licensee Operating Company. In these cases, we identified the patent holder as an Operating Company because the Operating Company was likely
financing the litigation, taking a large percentage of the win75. Jeruss et al., supra note 4, at 365 (“Given our focus on patent holders
who file infringement cases, we chose to exclude declaratory judgment cases”).
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nings (if any), and controlling litigation strategy. Even less
common was a lawsuit involving two plaintiffs, one of which
was a University patent holder and the other was an exclusive
76
licensee Operating Company. In this case, we would assume
that the Operating Company was financing and controlling the
litigation. Consequently, we classified that sort of case as an
Operating Company case. Therefore, we believe that our count
of Individual Inventors and Universities is rather conservative
because we coded some cases in which these entity types are
the patent holder as Operating Company cases.
We classified all patent holders into one and only one of the
following groups: (1) University; (2) Individual Inventor; (3)
Large Patent Aggregator; (4) Failed Operating or Start-up
Company; (5) Patent Holding Company; (6) Operating Company; (7) IP Holding Company Owned by Operating Company;
and (8) Technology Development Company. These categories
seemed to capture the essential features of the policy debate.
For instance, we separated Individual Inventors from Patent
Holding Companies because some argue that a key shortcoming
of “trolls” is that they do not return sufficient money to the
77
original inventor. Individual Inventors likely received a substantial percentage of the proceeds from suits in which they
were named as the plaintiff; whereas it is less clear that the
original inventor received a substantial percentage of cases
78
brought by Patent Holding Companies.
For a small number of companies, we could not determine
in which group to classify them and therefore labeled them as
undetermined. If any coder was unsure of the classification of a
patentee, then the coder would code the classification as “unsure” or “undermined.” We then had a second author review the
79
coding on these entities. Almost no companies remained classified as undetermined after the second review.
To determine the proper classification for a plaintiff we
looked at several sources. First, we reviewed the complaint
filed in the lawsuit. Sometimes, the complaint mentioned
whether products were being manufactured by the patent hold76. To provide some context on how frequently this arose, we found thirteen patent lawsuits filed in 2010 involving University and Operating Company co-plaintiffs. Our core results remain unchanged, even if one were to classify these as University patent holders.
77. See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2151 n.148.
78. See id.
79. As an additional layer of reliability, we had student coders verify the
cases we were unsure of, as well as other cases.
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er and whether those products were covered by the patents at
issue. If the complaint made that sort of statement, then we
coded the patent holder as an Operating Company. It was not
feasible for us to investigate the quantity of products being
manufactured or the timing of the manufacture. When the
complaint was silent (as it was in the majority of cases), we
used web searches to obtain information about the patent holder. If the patent holder had a website indicating that it manufactured products, then we classified it as an Operating Company.
Below is a brief description of each category.
(1) University: A public or private institution of higher
80
learning. It includes foreign and domestic institutions. An example is Cornell University.
(2) Individual Inventor: One or more inventors who own(s)
a patent (i.e., it is unassigned to a company). Often the party to
the litigation would be an individual litigating in their individual capacity. We also included family trusts in this category.
Additionally, if it appeared that an individual had formed a
corporate vehicle that she completely controlled for the primary
purposes of litigation, then we coded this as an individual, and
we also created a separate subcategory of individuals litigating
in a corporate capacity. This arose when the name of the corporate vehicle included the name of the Individual Inventor and
no products were being sold. For instance, Ronald A. Katz
Technology Licensing, L.P. (RAKTL) asserts patents invented
81
by Ronald A. Katz. While Ronald Katz does not technically
hold these patents in his individual capacity, we believe that
RAKTL is best understood as an Individual Inventor. Sometimes our review of corporate records revealed that the Individual Inventor owned all of the shares of the corporation. Unfortunately, such corporate records were not available for all
companies, especially for companies we identified as Patent
Holding Companies. Consequently, we suspect we may undercount the number of individuals litigating in a corporate capac80. We do not believe that any of the entities we categorized as universities were instead patent holding companies that were named to sound like
universities. We reviewed the complaints for all cases and the complaints contained recitations of each party in the case. The recitation of universities typically indicated something along the lines that they were not-for-profit educational institutions.
81. See Company Overview of Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, L.P.,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=7672486 (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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ity, and similarly overcount Patent Holding Companies. Finally, we note that one of these coding decisions, in a patent owned
by an entity named GeoTag, is important to our results, as the
patent is asserted in numerous litigations, which could skew
82
our results.
(3) Large Patent Aggregator: A company with a large patent portfolio whose primary business is enforcing patents of
83
numerous other individuals and entities. This includes Acacia
84
companies and Intellectual Ventures.
(4) Failed Operating or Start-up Company: A company that
originally invented the patent-in-suit and attempted to com82. GeoTag is a company frequently in the news. See, e.g., Peter Bright,
Google and Microsoft Team Up to Battle Geotagging Patent Troll, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 3, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/
2011/03/google-and-microsoft-team-up-to-battle-geotagging-patent-troll/ (stating that GeoTag sued at least 397 different companies); Ameet Sachdev,
Obama Tries To Curb Some Patent-Holding Firms, CHI. TRIB. (June 5, 2013),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-0605-patent-trolls-20130605
-story.html (“Hundreds of retailers, for example, were sued in 2010 by a patent-holding company called GeoTag Inc. for having websites that used store
locater functions.”). We coded GeoTag as an Individual Inventor since we understand that one of the original co-inventors owns 100% of GeoTag. GeoTag is
a difficult coding decision, as the patent was originally owned by a start-up
company that employed the inventor. According to a declaratory judgment
complaint lodged against GeoTag, the patent has changed ownership five
times, and the original inventor was involved in all of the transfers. Complaint
at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. GeoTag, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Del. 2011) (No.
11CV00175), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/
delaware/dedce/1:2011cv00175/45847/1/0.pdf?1299179190. We believe that
this scenario fits more closely to an Individual Inventor. Alternatively, some
may classify it as a Failed Start-up. It seems, to us, quite different from a patent holding company which purchases a patent and has no preexisting relationship with the original inventors.
83. The line between Patent Holding Company and Aggregator is not
completely clean. We generally used the Aggregator category sparingly, limiting it to companies that had assembled via acquisition of portfolios with hundreds of patents or more.
84. We identified Acacia companies by several mechanisms. Acacia sometimes litigates in its own name. See Rachael King, Acacia: The Company Tech
Loves to Hate, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www
.businessweek.com/stories/2010-02-01/acacia-the-company-tech-loves-tohatebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
Other
times, an Acacia subsidiary or other company with an agreement with Acacia
is the patent holder and does not contain “Acacia” in its corporate name. See
id. We located what we believe are most of these companies by analyzing Acacia press releases of settlements, which identified the Acacia company. Furthermore, we checked the corporate ownership information for most of the patent holders. Acacia’s name often was visible in a corporate ownership check.
If the company was an Acacia company, we coded it as a Large Aggregator,
regardless of the underlying company’s entity type.
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mercialize the technology. At present, the company sells no
products and its primary business appears to be patent litigation. An example of the Failed Operating or Start-up Company
is Broadband Graphics LLC.
(5) Patent Holding Company: Companies, usually limited
liability companies, that appear to have been formed solely to
hold and enforce a patent or small portfolio of patents. As far as
we can tell, these companies are not owned by the original inventor. Frequently, these companies were formed shortly before
litigation was commenced.
(6) Operating Company: Companies that manufacture
products or deliver services (other than licensing patents). An
example of an Operating Company is Hewlett Packard. We
have not analyzed whether the Operating Company is making
85
use of the patent-in-suit.
(7) IP Holding Company Owned by Operating Company:
Companies that were wholly-owned by Operating Companies.
For instance, AT&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. is an IP Holding Company for AT&T Inc.
(8) Technology Development Company: A company which
invested in the development of technology, perhaps with the intention of licensing rather than commercialization. A Technology Development Company is the original owner of the patents
but does not manufacture products covered by the patents. Examples of Technology Development companies are Walker Digital LLC and Tessera Technologies.
As previously mentioned, we coded a subset of each other’s
coding. From a mathematical calculation, the reliability of our
86
coding appears quite high. That said, one should be aware
85. We know that some operating companies assert patents that they do
not utilize in their business operations. See Ted M. Sichelman, The Vonage
Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent Bullying,” 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1856703.
86. We chose Cohen’s kappa as the measure of inter-coder agreement. See
Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 113–14 (2008) (stating that the best practice
for relaying reliability information is to report a coefficient such as “Cohen’s
kappa”). Cohen’s kappa ranges from 0 to 1, with numbers near 1 indicating a
higher degree of reliability. Id. For our 2010 unique parties, Cohen’s kappa is
0.653, which equates to “[s]ubstantial agreement.” Anthony J. Viera & Joanne
M. Garrett, Understanding Interobserver Agreement: The Kappa Statistic, 37
FAM. MED. 360, 362 (2005). For our 2012 unique parties, Cohen’s kappa is
0.836, which equates to “[a]lmost perfect agreement.” Id. By calculating
kappas on unique parties instead of all parties, we likely overstate the amount
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that our coding is based upon publicly available information. It
is quite possible that some of the companies have confidential
transactions relating to the patents that would affect our coding. For instance, some of the Patent Holding Companies may
be affiliated with the original inventor, although we cannot tell
that from the available public information. Furthermore, it is
often difficult to identify Failed Start-ups.
D. OTHER DATA
We counted the number of accused infringers in each lawsuit. We hand counted the defendants after an earlier version
87
of this article used an estimation procedure. To hand count,
we pulled the complaint, and any amended complaints, for each
coded lawsuit and counted the number of defendants listed. We
included in the defendant count any party identified by the
88
plaintiff(s) as a defendant in the complaint. For declaratory
judgment cases, we counted plaintiffs as “defendants,” and if
Does were listed as defendants, we counted them as a single
“defendant” regardless of the number of individual Does identified. A defendant was still counted as a “defendant” even if they
were dismissed from a lawsuit. However, if a party became a
defendant in a suit via consolidation from another suit, we did
not count them as a “defendant” to prevent double-counting.
We did all of this to ensure accuracy in our defendant count
numbers. Although we report the information relying upon the
of disagreement in our respective coding. For instance, the kappa for 2012 duplicate parties is .956, indicating that we almost always agree on the patent
holders who appear multiple times in the dataset. We did not code an overlapping set of duplicate parties in 2010 so we cannot report a similar kappa. The
difference between the 2010 and 2012 kappas likely reflects an incremental
improvement in our coding methodology which we refined as we went along,
and the numbers do not likely reflect any underlying issue related to the parties or that there is significant subjectivity in our individual coding approaches.
87. In an earlier draft of this article, we estimated the number of defendants from the raw information provided by Bloomberg Law. More specifically,
we counted the number of parties to the lawsuit, as identified by Bloomberg
Law, and subtracted one to attempt to remove the plaintiff from the total. After we received feedback from Professor Robin Feldman that our estimated
number appeared too low, we hand counted the number of defendants for each
utility patent infringement suit.
88. Unfortunately, it was unfeasible for us to exclude “related” defendants. Thus, if two distinct yet apparently related corporate entities (i.e., LG
Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics USA Inc.) appeared as separate defendants, we counted those as two defendants. In follow-on research, we are manually identifying such related parties to permit them to be removed, when appropriate.
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hand counted numbers below, the differences between the hand
counts and estimated counts have no material effect on the
89
main findings of the Article. More specifically, the joinder rule
changes appear to be responsible for nearly all of the change in
patent litigation defendants between 2010 and 2012.
Docket Navigator also graciously provided us data about
claim construction, the process of determining the scope of pa90
tent protection accorded to a patent claim. More specifically,
Docket Navigator told us which patent lawsuits in 2010 had resulted in a claim construction and which had not. The data captured whether the claims had been construed and which claims
were construed during summary judgment motions, in a separate claim construction hearing or proceeding, or at another
time during the litigation. We tested a random sample of 2% of
the data provided by Docket Navigator and found the data to be
91
highly reliable.
Finally, we obtained a list of the patent numbers asserted
in each case in 2010. We recorded the information that Bloomberg Law generated for each case. It appears that Bloomberg
Law used an automated means to scrape the complaints and
capture the patent numbers affiliated with each case. After re89. The hand count resulted in a total of 9,894 and 9,419 defendants in
2010 and 2012, respectively. Our original estimation was 11,671 defendants in
2010 and 11,603 defendants in 2012. There are several reasons for the difference. First, some cases had multiple plaintiffs. Second, some parties that appear as “parties” in Bloomberg Law’s data are not defendants. For instance,
Bloomberg Law identifies special masters or members of the media seeking
access to documents as parties. Finally, Bloomberg Law had an occasional error when cases were consolidated. The original lawsuits with the correct number of defendants were present in most of the cases. However, in one case,
Bloomberg Law provided a list of all of the defendants. This resulted in double
counting using the original method. Our hand counting method properly recognized that these consolidated defendants were not part of the complaint in
the case, and consequently these defendants were excluded.
90. See generally Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the
Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033–34
(2007) (discussing how courts interpret patent claims).
91. More specifically, we randomly selected 50 cases from 2010. For those
cases, we studied the docket report for the litigation, reviewing all relevant
documents, to determine if the claims had been construed. We then compared
our results with the data provided by Docket Navigator on claim construction.
For 49 of the 50 cases, we agreed with Docket Navigator. In one case, we identified claim constructions that were not reported by Docket Navigator. Upon
investigation, Docket Navigator informed us that the order construing claims
was not immediately available from PACER when filed, so Docket Navigator
was unable to record the construed terms when it initially processed the document. Docket Navigator was able to obtain the document at a later date and
back-fill the missing claim constructions.
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viewing the Bloomberg Law patent number information, we
92
had concerns about its accuracy. We attempted to manually
correct the Bloomberg Law results when they appeared likely
to be inaccurate. Because we used the patent numbers merely
to roughly categorize by technology, we believe that the inaccu93
racies may be less important.
III. RESULTS
As previously discussed, we initially collected 3,553 cases
filed in 2010 and 5,600 cases filed in 2012 identified as “830—
94
Patent” cases in PACER, through Bloomberg Law. We manually removed false marking cases; cases involving only design
patents; cases that did not include an allegation of patent infringement; and “duplicate” filings, such as corresponding declaratory judgment actions to already filed infringement actions and consolidations of already filed cases. This left 2,520
utility patent infringement cases filed in 2010 and 5,185 filed
in 2012. These constituted the universe of cases that we analyzed further.
The distribution of the raw number of utility patent infringement cases filed by each patentee category is set forth be95
low in Figure 1 for 2010 and 2012.

92. We reviewed a random sample of Bloomberg Law’s coding and found
10–20% of the cases had errors in the patent numbers. The errors appeared
especially likely in declaratory judgment complaints in which the plaintiff alleged inequitable conduct. These allegations often mentioned patent numbers
of allegedly undisclosed prior art, and Bloomberg Law mistakenly included
these patent numbers as being asserted in the case.
93. Take, for example, a case with detailed allegations of inequitable conduct including a recitation of patents that allegedly were withheld from the
Patent Office. In this case, Bloomberg Law’s automated manner of identifying
the litigated patents would wrongly determine that the patents in the inequitable conduct allegations were patents-in-suit. However, it is likely that all of
the patents in the inequitable conduct allegation are in the same technological
field as the actual patents-in-suit, as they must be “material” in order to complete the allegation for inequitable conduct. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Since we only used
patents at the level of technological field, these errors would not affect our
analysis.
94. See supra Part II.B.
95. There were only four patentees we could not categorize, all in the patent lawsuits filed in 2010. These patentees included Conectflex Technologies
LLC, Locked and Loaded Products, Inc., Noah Systems, Inc., and One-to-One
Integrated Technologies.
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FIGURE 1: Cases Filed by Patent Holder Category,
2010 and 2012

The total number of utility patent infringement cases in96
creased from 2010 to 2012 from 2,520 to 5,185 cases. The
number of cases for each category of patentee, except IP Holding Companies, increased from 2010 to 2012. The greatest increase occurred in the Patent Holding Company category, with
the number of cases rising from 400 to 1,946. The number of
96. The difference in the distribution between 2010 and 2012 is statistically significant, with a Pearson’s chi-squared test reporting 591.2737 and a pvalue < 0.0001.
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lawsuits filed by Individual Inventors increased, but, interestingly, the percentage of those cases filed by a true individual
(as opposed to a corporate entity formed and owned by the Individual Inventor) dropped substantially. More specifically,
true Individual Inventors brought 68.4% of the Individual Inventor cases in 2010, but only 39.3% of the Individual Inventor
97
cases in 2012. The number of cases filed by Operating Companies increased from 1,748 cases to 2,202 cases. Operating
Companies still made up the largest percentage of cases filed in
both 2010 and 2012. In terms of percentages, Operating Companies patent holders made up a little under 50% of patent infringement lawsuits in 2012.
These numbers are insightful for studying the behavior of
different types of patent holders, but the change in the number
of filings could have been driven, at least in part, by the AIA’s
98
change to the joinder rules. To test whether the increase in
the number of cases filed is driven, at least in part, by the new
joinder rules, the data collected was examined to determine the
number of unique patentees that filed suit for each year—2010
99
and 2012. For 2010, we observed 1588 unique patentees. For
2012, there were 1667 unique patentees that filed suit.
Figure 2 sets forth the numbers and percentages of unique
patentees that filed for each patentee category in 2010 and
2012.

97. True individuals brought 132 of 193 cases in 2010 and 155 of 394 cases in 2012. If GeoTag is excluded, then true individuals brought 132 of 184
cases in 2010 (71.7%) and 157 of 299 cases in 2012 (52.5%), still a substantial
drop.
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012); Crouch, supra note 55.
99. We recognize that the joinder rules may have decreased the total
number of patent lawsuits because they required an additional filing fee for
each company selling a separate allegedly infringing product. According to this
theory, the cases should have decreased between 2010 and 2012, and if the data indicates a constant number of cases, then that may represent an increase.
In the future, we plan to investigate whether the total number of patents asserted have changed and also study how many patentees filed lawsuits in diverse district involving the same patent. We note, however, that the district
courts used a variety of approaches to reduce their workload when confronted
with separate lawsuits relating to the same patent. These included the use of
multi-district litigation (MDL) and consolidation of matters for pre-trial proceedings. See, e.g., In re: Bear Creek Tech., Inc., (‘722) Patent Litig., 858
F.Supp.2d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (centralizing 14 patent infringement actions
involving the same telecommunications patent). Consolidation and MDL made
the separate cases proceed similar to a single case naming multiple defendants. Thus, there may not have been a substantial increase in patent-side litigation costs caused by the joinder provision.
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FIGURE 2: Number of Unique Patentees, 2010 and
2012

The total number of unique patentees for each year studied, 2010 and 2012, was very similar (1,588 compared to 1,667
patentees). The similarity in terms of number of unique patentees is in sharp contrast to the data on the raw number of filings, which showed a large increase in litigation. And, as can be
seen above in Figure 2, the distribution among the various pa100
tentee types is nearly identical for each year. Thus, while
there was nearly double the number of lawsuits filed in 2012
than 2010, the number of patent holders involved in the patent
litigation system seemed essentially unchanged. Importantly,
the number of Patent Holding Companies, the category of patent holder that had the largest increase in the number of raw

100. The difference in the distribution of types of patents between 2010
and 2012 is not statistically significant, with a Pearson’s chi-squared test reporting 4.2256 and a p-value of 0.753.
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filings, had a much smaller increase when measured by unique
patentees.
However, these figures only account for the number of
unique patentees. Another, perhaps more important, perspective on the data is the number of defendants being sued by patentees in the various categories. As noted above, we hand
counted the number of defendants in each case using the com101
plaint, and any amended complaints, filed. Using this data,
we calculated the number of parties for each patentee catego102
ry.
Figure 3 sets forth the total number of defendants for each
patentee category in 2010 and 2012.

101. Every listed defendant in a given case is counted as a “defendant” for
the purposes of this analysis. The only exceptions are (a) those defendants
that are added to a case via consolidation (these are excluded to prevent double-counting) and (b) multiple “Does” (which are counted as a singular defendant regardless of how many does are listed). Even if a defendant is dismissed
from a suit, they are still counted as a “defendant.”
102. We acknowledge that this method treats all assertions by the same
patentee together, even if the assertions involved different patents. When we
obtain all of the patent numbers, we will investigate if this matters. We also
recognize that related companies are identified as separate defendants. In
other words, if Sony North America, Inc. and Sony Japan were separately sued
in a single case, they are counted as two defendants. In reality, they may be
represented by the same attorney and raise the same litigation arguments. It
was not feasible for us to manually adjust the count of defendants to collapse
these related defendants. We will investigate in a future paper whether collapsing related defendants matters.
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FIGURE 3: Total Number of Defendants by Type of
103
Patentee, 2010 and 2012

The number of defendants stayed relatively constant between 2010 and 2012 for most patentee categories. The total
number of defendants was 9,894 in 2010 and 9,419 in 2012.
Specifically relevant to the PAE debate, the number of Patent
Holding Companies increased from 2,907 to 3,097—a relatively
small change. The two notable changes, although not dramatic,
were in the number of defendants in Individual Inventor and
104
Large Aggregator patentee cases. The number of parties in
Individual Inventor cases decreased from 1,134 in 2010 to 705
in 2012. And the number of parties increased for Large Aggregators from 453 in 2010 to 619 in 2012.

103. As discussed in a previous draft of this article, we used Bloomberg’s
total number of parties as the basis for computing the number of defendants.
We ultimately counted all defendants ourselves. Notably, while the absolute
numbers changed, the relationships between the two years for each category
do not vary much, at all, between hand counting defendants and using Bloomberg’s total number of parties metric.
104. A Pearson’s chi-squared test reported a 292.8967 and a p-value
< 0.0001.
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One benefit of our granular data is that it can be used to
construct counts of PAEs based upon various definitions of
PAEs. In other words, depending upon one’s view of which entities are properly labeled PAEs, one can construct relevant statistics. Some believe that PAEs are all non-operating companies including Individual Inventors, Failed Start-ups,
Universities, Technology Development Companies, along with
Patent Holding Companies and Patent Aggregators. Using such
a broad definition, the percentage of unique patentees increased from 2010 to 2012 by 2.7 percentage points (28.5% in
2010; 31.1% in 2012) and the percentage of defendants sued by
PAEs increased from 2010 to 2012 by 1.6 percentage points
(53.3% in 2010; 54.9% in 2012). For those who exclude Individual Inventors from their definition of PAEs, the percentage of
unique patentees increased by 2.0 percentage points (19.5% in
2010; 21.5% in 2012) and 5.6 percentage points for the percentage of defendants (41.8% in 2010; 47.4% in 2012). For those
who include only non-original owners as PAEs—only Patent
Holding Companies and Patent Aggregators—the percentage of
unique patentees increased from 2010 to 2012 by 1.8 percentage points (14.9% in 2010; 16.7% in 2012) and the percentage of
defendants accounted for by these PAEs increased 5.4 percentage points (34.1% in 2010; 39.5% in 2012). All of these changes
are well below the magnitude set forth in the Executive Office
105
Report, but the actual differences depend upon the precise
definition of PAE used. Because the Executive Office Report relied upon proprietary industry data, we cannot directly compare the coding.
The number of defendants for 2010 can also be separately
analyzed by the technology at issue. Table I below illustrates
that the patent cases are dispersed across all technology fields,
but that Computers and Communications has substantially
more cases than the other technology fields. It has nearly double the number of cases and over triple the number of parties
than the other technology fields.

105. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6.
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TABLE I: Distribution of Patent Litigation by National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Technology Class, 2010

NBER Technology

# of
Cases
162

# of Defendants

2. Computers and Communications
3. Drugs and Medical

864

5,456

465

1,198

4. Electrical and Electronics

253

1,055

5. Mechanical

287

662

6. Others

484

1,167

1. Chemical (excluding Drugs)

333

We do not presently have the patent numbers affiliated
with the 2012 lawsuits; consequently, we cannot provide analogous information about 2012. To understand better the Computers and Communications National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) category in 2010, in Tables II and III below we
provide further information about that category as well as the
Drugs and Medical NBER category. We note stark differences
in the distribution of Individual Inventor and Patent Holding
Companies in the Computer and Communication and Drug and
Medical technology categories.
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FIGURE 4: Distribution of Patent Cases by Technology
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FIGURE 5: Distribution of Number of Defendants by
Technology

Notably, for 2010, the number of cases (864) and number of
defendants (5,456) in cases involving Computers and Communications was almost double the comparable numbers for the
next closest categories—Drugs and Medical (465 cases with
1,198 defendants) and Other (484 cases with 1,167 defendants).
For cases involving Computers and Communications, the highest number of cases was brought by Operating Companies (408
cases) and the highest number of defendants involved in patent
lawsuits was brought by plaintiffs who were Patent Holding
Companies (2,217 parties). Thus, in the Computers and Communications industry, most defendants were sued by nonOperating Companies. Operating Companies dominated cases
involving Drugs and Medicine, with 417 cases brought comprising 885 parties, excluding the patentee.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. EXPLORING THE LACK OF MATERIAL CHANGE BETWEEN 2010
AND 2012
Based on our data, there is no major difference between
both the number of unique patentees and the number of alleged
infringers from 2010 to 2012. Although the number of cases increased, the totals for the main players—patentees and defendants—stayed essentially constant. One way to consider this is
that the AIA has added substantial cost to the system, by increasing the number of lawsuits, without decreasing the num106
ber of patentees or defendants. This observation is confirmed
by a two-sample T test with unequal variances reporting a statistically significant variation in the distribution of the number
107
of parties excluding patentees for Individual Inventor, Patent
108
Holding Company, and Large Aggregator Patentee cases be109
tween 2010 and 2012.
The question, then, is how the distribution is different
within the various patentee categories. What are the changes
in behavior at a more granular level? In other words, what are
the changes between 2010 and 2012 that are not evident from
merely looking at the aggregate numbers of plaintiffs, defendants, and lawsuits? To explore this question further, we looked
at the number of patentees in a given category that make up
the four quartiles of the number of parties for each unique pa110
tentee in a given year. We ordered the defendants, beginning
with the unique patentees who sued the most parties. We then
divided the number of defendants in four equal groups, which
we label as quartiles. Figure 6 below shows the breakdown of
defendants by unique patentee.

106. These costs may not be that significant when one considers how the
courts have handled multiple lawsuits involving the same patent post-AIA.
Many districts try to hold costs down by consolidating cases for specific purposes such as claim construction and discovery. And multidistrict litigation is
also being used when the cases are dispersed across courts in multiple venues.
But, of course, there is no consolidation of trials.
107. T of 10.2173 with a p-value < 0.0001 for patent holding company cases.
108. T of 4.8446 with a p-value < 0.0001 for individual cases.
109. T of 4.7586 with a p-value < 0.0001 for large aggregator cases.
110. By unique patentee, we simply mean a particular patentee without
double counting.
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FIGURE 6: Distribution of Defendants by Unique Patentee, 2010 and 2012

As shown above in Figure 6, suits initiated by a small
number of unique patentees constitute a majority of the alleged
infringers for a given year. Thus, a very few patent holders are
responsible for a great number of patent lawsuits. For 2010, 26
patentees were responsible for the top quartile of parties, while
35 patentees were responsible for the top quartile in 2012. And
this distribution by the number of patentees making up each
quartile is very similar for both 2010 and 2012 (92 to 105 patentees for the second quartile, 262 to 282 for the third quartile, and 1,212 to 1,245 patentees for the bottom quartile). These results are not surprising. A small group of aggressive
patentees were targeting the most alleged infringers while
about 75% of the patentees fall into the last quartile, most of
whom simply sue only one alleged infringer. Consequently,
most patent holders are not significant in terms of the rate of
overall patent litigation.
To understand how the categories of patentees relate to the
distribution, set forth below is this quartile information, showing the number of parties, divided into quartiles, involved for
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each patentee category. This information is presented for both
2010 and 2012 in Figures 7 and 8 below.
FIGURE 7: Quartiles by Number Defendants per
Unique Patentee, 2010
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FIGURE 8: Quartiles by Number of Defendants per
Unique Patentee, 2012

As shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, there are some differences in distribution between the two years worth noting. The
number of accused infringers in each quartile did differ, particularly for the first and second quartiles. In 2010, the top quartile included unique patentees alleging infringement against
between 52 and 422 accused infringers. In 2012, the top quartile included unique patentees alleging infringement against
fewer accused infringers (between 37 and 134). The second
quartile ranged from 17 to 51 in 2010, and 15 to 36 in 2012.
The third quartile included from 6 to 17 in 2010, and 5 to 15 in
2012. The bottom quartile ranged from 1 to 6 in 2010, and 1 to
5 in 2012.
The other difference is the distribution for Individual/Family Trust patentees and Large Aggregators between the
two years. In 2010, mainly due to the activity of one patentee,
GeoTag, Individual/Family Trust patentees made up a much
greater percentage of the top quartile as compared to 2012. Patent Aggregators also grew in the top quartile from 2010 until
2012. The presence of a major IP Holding Company of an Operating Company, U.S. Ethernet Innovations LLC, in the top
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quartile in 2010 also created a difference in distribution for the
top tier between the two years.
Accordingly, only about 25% of the unique patentees alleged infringement against 75% of the defendants for each year.
And the only material changes between the make-up of the
quartiles between the two years is the number of defendants
per patentee for the upper quartiles. In 2010, fewer unique patentees sued the first quartile (25%) of the defendants than in
2012. This may have been because it was cheaper to sue numerous defendants in 2010—because the defendants could be
sued in a single lawsuit—than in 2012, after the AIA joinder
rules went into effect. However, it is difficult to fully analyze
these differences with only two years of data. In the Appendix,
we provide further analysis of the distribution of different types
of patentees in 2010 and 2012.
The data can also be analyzed focusing on the small number of patentees that are suing large swathes of alleged infringers. To see if this is the case, we calculated the top ten patentees, by number of parties involved in the lawsuits, for each of
the observed years. These “top ten” lists are set forth below.
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FIGURE 9: Top Ten Most Litigious Patent Holders, 2010

Uniloc USA Inc. provides a good example of how our coding may differ from others. Some people anecdotally refer to
111
Uniloc as a “troll.” When we performed our original coding
(summer 2013), our investigation indicated that Uniloc sells
products that are related to their patents. More specifically, a
Google search for Uniloc USA Inc. returned a link for
http://www.uniloc.com.
That website included a link to
“NetAuthority.” When that link was activated, the user was redirected to the website for http://netauthority.com, and products related to the patents in suit were clearly being sold by
111. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, You Can’t Patent Simple Math, Judge Tells Patent Troll Uniloc, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 28, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech
-policy/2013/03/you-cant-patent-simple-math-judge-tells-patent-troll-uniloc.
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Uniloc USA Inc. We used the Wayback Machine to confirm
that Uniloc, through NetAuthority, was selling products back
112
in 2010. Accordingly, Uniloc USA Inc. was coded as an Oper113
ating Company.
ArrivalStar is another company that was somewhat difficult
to classify. ArrivalStar does not appear to be the original owner
of the patents in suit. However, the original inventor appears to
114
have some affiliation with the company. We limited the Individual Inventor category to true individuals and to corporate
entities which were controlled entirely by the original, individual inventor. We did not feel that there was sufficiently clear
information to classify ArrivalStar as an Individual Inventor
company, and instead classified it as a Patent Holding Company.
Finally, although some have called Realtime Data LLC
115
d/b/a IXO an “NPE,” we classified it as an Operating Company. Its website (http://ixorealtime.com/About_Us.html) and the
116
complaints in the lawsuits indicate that it makes products.
Furthermore, Business Week notes it was founded in 1998 and
117
sells software. We note that several of the most litigious patent holders were close calls on categorization. We believe that
these entities were some of the more difficult to classify. Our

112. See WAYBACK MACHINE, https://web.archive.org/web/20100105213003/
http://uniloc.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
113. During the editing process for this article (fall 2014), the Uniloc website no longer contained a link to NetAuthority, and the NetAuthority website
was also defunct. This is largely not relevant to our coding since we strive to
identify whether Uniloc sold products in 2010, when it brought the lawsuits.
Separately, a patent litigator who represented a defendant charged with infringement by Uniloc told us that he had been unable to obtain any commercial products made by Uniloc in discovery. Investigation into such statements
is beyond the scope of this Article. We believe that Uniloc is a close call on
whether it is an Operating Company, a Failed Start-up, or Patent Holding
Company.
114. See Tom De Poto, New Jersey Firm Stands Up to Patent Trolls,
NJ.COM (Sept. 6, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2013/
09/jersey_firm_stands_up_to_paten.html.
115. Ahmed J. Davis & Karolina Jesien, The Balance of Power in Patent
Law: Moving Toward Effectiveness in Addressing Patent Troll Concerns, 22
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 835, 844 (2012).
116. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement ¶ 1,
Realtime Data, LLC v. Thompson Reuters, 897 F. Supp. 2d 146 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 11-cv-06703), 2011 WL 4576896.
117. Company Overview of Realtime Data LLC, BUSINESS WEEK,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privca
pId=142803119 (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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discussion here of these entities should not be read to imply
that all of the classifications involved similar difficulties.
FIGURE 10: Top Ten Most Litigious Patent Holders, 2012

In a prior draft of this article, we discussed the coding of
Brandywine Communications Technologies LLC. After report118
ing that Brandywine appeared to be a subsidiary of Acacia,
we noted that Brandywine’s website indicated that it sold
119
Based upon this information, we believed that
products.
Brandywine was best categorized as an Operating Company.
We have investigated further, and now believe that Brandywine is best categorized as an Aggregator due to its relationship with Acacia. Our further investigation included a phone
call to the number listed on Brandywine’s website. Representatives for the company indicated that it was unaffiliated with
118. See Acacia Subsidiary Enters into License and Settlement Agreement
with Mitel Networks Corporation, DAILY FIN. (May 17, 2013, 6:22 AM),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/05/17/acacia-subsidiary-enters-into-licenseand-settleme.
119. See BRANDYWINE COMM., http://www.brandywinecomm.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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the patent holder in the lawsuits. Accordingly, we revised our
classification of this entity.
We also revised the coding of another “Top Ten” patent
holder, Blue Spike LLC. Originally, we coded Blue Spike as an
Operating Company because Blue Spike’s website (http://bluespike.myshopify.com/collections/frontpage) indicates that it
sells products, and Blue Spike recently applied for a federal
trademark on its products, indicating under oath that it was
120
using the mark in commerce. We noted that the coding was a
close call because Blue Spike’s website also prominently mentions its patents and the company has an office in Tyler, Texas,
which may have been formed to establish closer ties to the
Eastern District of Texas. Upon further investigation, including
discussions with an attorney who represented the company, we
understand that Blue Spike does not currently sell products. It
appears that the individual inventor who formed Blue Spike
and serves as its President and CEO was involved in the early
development of the technology-at-issue, digital watermarking.
Because the company failed in the marketplace, we coded it as
a Failed Operating Company/Start-up.
Coding issues aside, a couple of observations are relevant.
For 2010, the top ten patentees accounted for 1,396 (14.11%) of
the total parties involved in patent infringement suits, while in
2012, the top ten accounted for 1,061 (11.26%) of the total parties involved. In 2010, one patentee, GeoTag, dominated the top
ten list, whereas the distribution in 2012 was more even. Notably, two patentees make both lists—GeoTag and ArrivalStar
S.A.. And these top ten lists are made up of a smattering of patentees from numerous patentee categories. Interestingly, three
large Aggregators, Unified Messaging Solutions LLC, Brandywine Communications Technologies LLC, and Digitech Image Technologies LLC—all affiliated with Acacia Technologies—made the list in 2012.
Therefore, based on the data we gathered, things have not
changed much from 2010 to 2012. While more lawsuits were
filed, the number of unique patentees and defendants remained
constant, and the distribution of these numbers among patentee categories stayed roughly the same as well. Furthermore,
most patent litigation, that involving at least 75% of the patentees, has remained nearly the same between these two
years.
120. TRADEMARKS411,
http://trademarks411.com/marks/86096173-blue
-spike (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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B. COMPARING OUR DATA TO PREVIOUS STUDIES
Our results can also be compared to previous studies regarding litigation characteristics of different type of patentees.
Two specific studies that we looked at are those by Feldman et
121
122
al. and RPX Corporation. A summary of the comparison of
the data between the studies and ours is set forth below in Table II.
Table II: Comparison of Descriptive Findings from
Various Studies

Type of PatenteePlaintiff in
Various Studies
Feldman et
al.123
Feldman et al.
(Individual Inventors)
Feldman et al.
(Failed Startups only)

%
Cases
Filed
in
2010
by
PAEs
N/A124
N/A
N/A127

% Cases Filed
in 2012
by
PAEs
58.7%
(2,750
cases)
4.1%
(206
cases)126
N/A

% Parties/Allege
d Infringers Involved in
PAE suits
in 2010
N/A125
N/A
N/A

% Parties/Alleged
Infringers
Involved in
PAE suits in
2012
49.90%
(4,606 defendants)
6.27% (579
defendants)
N/A

121. Feldman et al., supra note 52.
122. RPX CORP., supra note 15.
123. The data in this table from Feldman et al. focuses on what they coded
as a “patent monetization entity” or “monetizer,” which, based on their article,
excludes “Individual or Trust” and “University.” Feldman et al., supra note 52,
at 16, 24–26.
124. Feldman et al. did not report data from 2010. See id. at 15.
125. Again, Feldman et al. did not report 2010 data. See id.
126. While RPX does not disaggregate its data, it reported that “94% of
2012 suits brought by entities that do not practice were brought by corporate
PAEs.” Chien, supra note 3. We suspect that RPX may be classifying individual inventors who form a wholly-owned corporate vehicle to enforce their patents as “corporate PAEs.”
127. Feldman et al. did not classify Failed Start-ups or Failed Operating
Companies separately. See Feldman et al., supra note 52, at 40.

SCHWARTZ et al_5fmt

2014]

11/30/2014 3:19 PM

PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES

Feldman et al.
(Technology
Development
Cos. only)
RPX129
RPX (Failed
start-ups only)
RPX (Technology Development Companies)
Cotropia,
Kesan,
Schwartz132
(Large Aggregators + Patent
Holding Companies)
Cotropia,
Kesan,
Schwartz134
(Large Aggregators + Patent
Holding Companies + Individuals)

693

N/A128

N/A

N/A

N/A

30%
(765
cases)
N/A130

65%
(3,054
cases)
N/A

55%
(4,170 defendants)
N/A

61% (4,351
defendants)
N/A

N/A131

N/A

N/A

N/A

17.80
%133
(448
cases)

43.93%
(2,278
cases)

34.06%
(3,370 defendants)

39.45%
(3,716 defendants)

25.48
%
(641
cases)

51.53%
(2,672
cases)

45.52%
(4,504 defendants)

46.94%
(4,421 defendants)

128. Feldman et al. did not classify Technology Development Companies
separately. Cf. id. at 18–27 (discussing the study design and company classifications).
129. RPX’s data represented in this table identified “non-practicing entities” or “NPEs.” RPX CORP., supra note 15, at 3.
130. RPX did not report data on Failed Start-ups or Failed Operating
Companies separately. Cf. id. at 7–8 (discussing the study’s methodology and
definitions).
131. RPX did not report data on Technology Development Companies separately. Cf. id.
132. Our data in this column combines patentees in the Large Aggregator
and Patent Holding Company categories.
133. Ideally, we would report the same number of significant digits for each
study. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the raw data for the other studies, and consequently report it here exactly as it is available to us.
134. Our data in this row combines patentees in the Large Aggregator, Patent Holding Company, and Individuals categories.
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Cotropia,
Kesan,
Schwartz
(Failed Operating Companies/Failed
Start-ups)

1.9%
(48)

6.4%
(382)

4% (400)

4% (380)

Cotropia,
Kesan,
Schwartz
(Technology
Development
Companies)
Cotropia,
Kesan,
Schwartz (individual/family
trust)

1.4%
(34)

1.7%
(87)

1% (95)

2.4% (229)

7.7%
(193)

7.6%
(394)

11.5%
(1135)

7.5% (705)

As detailed below, there are differences, and these differences are driven, at least in part, by the patentee categories
used in the various studies and the level of detail used when
reporting the data.
1. Cases Filed
Regarding the distribution of cases among the various categories, Feldman et al. found, in the one year overlapping with
our study, that 58.7% of the patentees were “Monetizers” in
135
2012. And RPX found that “Non-Practicing Entities” (“NPEs”)
filed 3,054 cases in 2012 (65% of all patent infringement cases)
136
and 765 cases in 2010 (30% of all patent infringement cases).
In comparison, adding our Large Aggregator and Patent
Holding Company category results together to facilitate a proper comparison, our findings show these two categories comprising 448 cases (17.80%) in 2010 and 2,278 cases (43.93%) in
2012. If the Individual/Family Trust results are added to Large
Aggregator and Patent Holding Company results, the findings
135. Feldman et al., supra note 52, at 37 (“Most significantly, monetizers
crossed into the majority in 2012, having filed 58.7% of patent infringement
lawsuits.”). We do not compare to Professor Chien’s data as she relies upon
RPX data for her studies.
136. RPX CORP., supra note 15, at 11 (Chart 4).
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show 641 cases (25.48%) in 2010 and 2,672 cases (51.53%) in
2012.
Accordingly, even if Individual/Family Trust cases are
added to categories that more closely fit the other studies’ definitions of Monetizers and PAEs, our data reports significantly
lower percentages as compared to those of Feldman et al. and
RPX. These differences could be driven by the different categorical definitions used in the studies. We also believe that the differences are driven by how the data is coded, analyzed, and reported in these studies, and that a comparison of the actual
raw data may demonstrate smaller differences between the
studies’ results.
One final point: while we are comparing the data regarding
the number of cases filed, this metric, particularly after the
change to the joinder rules, loses much of its significance. As
we demonstrate above, the real change between 2010 and 2012
is only in the number of lawsuits being filed, not in the number
of accused infringers or in the number of patentees behind
those cases.
2. Number of Parties/Defendants
Thus, the more important point of comparison pertains to
the number of parties/defendants in the observed lawsuits.
Feldman et al. found that in 2012 Monetizers sued 4,606 defendants as compared to 3,832 defendants sued by Operating
137
Companies and 579 defendants by Individuals or Trusts.
Breaking Feldman’s results into percentages, Monetizer defendants comprised 49.90% of the total, Operating Companies
41.51%, and Individuals 6.27%. RPX found that NPEs sued
138
4,170 defendants in 2010 and 4,351 defendants in 2012. RPX
concluded that NPE suits made up 55% of defendants sued in
139
2010 and 61% in 2012.
In comparison, our data shows that Large Aggregators and
Patent Holding Companies comprise, together, 34.06% (3,370)
of the total number of parties in suits excluding the patentee in
2010 and 39.45% (3,716) in 2012. Adding Individual/Family
Trust cases increases the total number of parties in suits excluding the patentee to 4,504 (45.52%) in 2010 and 4,421
(46.94%) in 2012. This is in contrast to Operating Company

137. Feldman et al., supra note 52, at 44.
138. RPX CORP., supra note 15, at 11 (Chart 5).
139. Id. at 12 (Chart 8).
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cases, which involved 46.72% (4,622) of the parties in 2010 and
45.10% (4,248) in 2012.
The proper comparison between the studies is the percentages since Feldman et al. and RPX report the number of defendants among the various patentee categories, while we re140
port the total number of parties for our categories. And under
this comparison, just as with the comparison of the number of
cases filed, our data indicates that Patent Holding Companies
and Large Aggregators make up a smaller percentage of defendants than reported by Feldman et al. and RPX. Again, these differences could be driven by the different categorical definitions used in these studies. We also believe that the
differences are driven by how the data is coded, analyzed, and
reported in these studies, and that comparison of the actual
raw data could demonstrate smaller differences between these
studies.
C. CONSIDERING POTENTIAL INCREASES IN PATENT ASSERTIONS
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF OUR STUDY
Our study carefully examines patent lawsuits filed in 2010
and 2012. In this Section, we discuss theories that there was an
increase in patent assertions that our study does not capture.
First, our study is limited to 2010 and 2012. We chose
those years because of the growing literature claiming that
there was an explosion of PAE activity between 2010 and 2012.
After we made a draft of our article public, opponents of PAEs
acknowledged that the recent uptick was caused by the AIA
141
joinder rules. After backing off the claim of a recent explosion, some claim that there was a large increase in PAE activi142
ty earlier, namely from 2003 until 2010.
We offer several reactions. Initially, we note that all of the
data purporting to show the increase from 2003 until 2010 is
proprietary data gathered by private companies. We strongly
believe that data relating to PAEs should be made publicly
available for other researchers, including ourselves, to in140. Again, given the small number of suits with more than one plaintiff
and the even distribution of multiple plaintiff suits between the categories, we
believe the total number of parties data adequately represents changes in the
number alleged infringers in a given case, for a given category of patentee.
141. See James Bessen, ALL the Facts: PAEs Are Suing Many More Companies, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 28, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/facts
-suing-companies.html (noting a “minor error . . . affecting the period 2010 to
2012.”).
142. See id.
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143

spect. Putting aside the issue of publicly available data, we
note that we suspect that these opponents of PAEs are correct.
We believe, without having studied it empirically, there was a
large increase in PAE activity in the earlier time period. In
other words, our hypothesis is that more PAEs—especially Patent Holding Companies and Individual Inventors—
participated in the patent litigation system and sued more parties in 2010 than in 2003. To confirm (or refute) this hypothesis, one should empirically study litigation data from these
years. A consistent definition must be used when comparing litigation across the longer time period. We believe that a more
granular definition, like the one used in the present study,
which separates Universities, Individual Inventors, Failed
Start-ups, Technology Development Companies, Patent Holding Companies, Operating Companies, etc., is important. Thus,
while we suspect that there was an uptick in PAE litigation in
the last ten years, we believe that more transparent and better
data is needed to evaluate that hypothesis. But beyond PAEs,
there has been a large increase in the total number of patent
lawsuits filed each year from the early 1990s until the pre144
sent. Detailed, granular data about patent litigation across a
long period of time would be beneficial to understanding changes to the patent litigation ecosystem.
Separate from patent litigation in the courts, there are an145
ecdotal stories of an increase in patent demand letters. Our
study is limited to litigation in the federal courts, and does not
capture patent demand letter activity. These private letters are
notoriously difficult to accurately measure.
D. FUTURE AREAS FOR RESEARCH
The granular data we have provided can be supplemented
to shed more light on patent litigation. Below we list several
research questions that we believe are ripe for investigation.
We also note that we are presently gathering or acquiring in143. Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, & David L. Schwartz, The
Value of Open Data for Patent Policy, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 20, 2014), http://
patentlyo.com/patent/2014/02/value-patent-policy.html.
144. See Ron Katznelson, The America Invents Act at Work—The Major
Cause for the Recent Rise in Patent Litigation, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 15, 2013,
12:59 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/15/aia-the-major-cause-for
-rise-in-patent-litigation/id=39118.
145. See Joe Mullen, Patent Trolls Want $1,000 – For Using Scanners, ARS
TECHNICA (Jan. 2, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent
-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners.
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formation to enable us to answer each of these questions. We
take no position on the optimal number of patent lawsuits or
the optimal number of lawsuits by Patent Holding Companies.
We note, however, that Patent Holding Companies filed far
more than a trace number of lawsuits. By sheer numbers of
lawsuits, Patent Holding Companies are consequential to the
patent litigation system.
A critical question relates to the patents asserted by Patent
Holding Companies. By definition, these entities were not involved in the original inventive activity. Instead, they purchased the patent from the inventors or another entity. Research into the previous owners and chains of title of these
patents is sorely needed. We are unsure at this point whether
the patterns in previous patent ownership have changed between 2010 and 2012. Are these Patent Holding Company patents primarily from Individual Inventors, from Universities,
from Operating Companies? Has the proportion changed over
time? And there is another difficult to answer yet interesting
question: How many of the Patent Holding Company cases involve deals with Operating Companies to split the proceeds?
These “privateering” arrangements are not typically publicly
146
available, which makes them quite hard to study.
We also found that there were a small number of patent
holders in both 2010 and 2012 who were responsible for suing a
large number of defendants. Specifically, we found that 25% of
the patent holders in 2010 and 2012 sued 75% of the defendants. Even more pointedly, we found that 28 patent holders in
2010 and 30 patent holders in 2012 sued 25% of all the defendants. This asymmetric distribution in patent holders, with a
small number of them suing a large number of defendants,
raises numerous interesting questions about the nature of these patent holders and the characteristics of the patents which
were asserted against many defendants. We will leave this topic for further exploration in the future.
We also believe that more information regarding the outcomes of patent suits is desirable. This will permit us to compare how often type categories of patent holders are successful.
And rather than just considering the overall success rate, we
can consider the success rate of various parties in the distribution of cases.
146. See generally Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property
Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1 (2012)
(analyzing the phenomenon of IP privateering).
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Additionally, we believe that information about the duration of case pendency is salient. The longer a case pends, the
higher the legal expenses in general. We suspect that the median Patent Holding Company case pends for shorter than the
median Operating Company case. Information about pendency
can inform the debate about the costs of PAE disputes and perhaps provide insight into the merits of the disputes.
Finally, we recognize that even our granular coding of patent holders has its limitations. Obviously, even the most granular categories are not homogeneous. There must be good and
bad Patent Holding Company lawsuits, just as there are good
and bad Operating Company lawsuits. To determine whether
NPEs, PAEs, or Individual Inventors (or whatever group one is
interested in) are good or bad (or a net cost or a net benefit to
the system), one must first understand the make-up of the
group and how it compares to other patent litigants. We welcome further refinements to our coding and other ideas on how
one can tease out important heterogeneities within our groups.
V. CONCLUSION
Profound changes appear to be occurring in the patent system. There is a vigorous debate about which entities ought to
be the rightful beneficiaries in a well-designed patent system
and which entities are currently, in fact, reaping monetary rewards by asserting patents. Granular data on the identities of
patent holder litigants is necessary to consider the arguments
being advanced and to understand the implications of the
changes to the patent system that we are experiencing. The
present study provides such granular data, classifying patent
holders into numerous categories including Failed Start-ups,
Individual Inventors, Patent Holding Companies, Operating
Companies, and Aggregators. It shows that the changes themselves are much more complex than previously understood. In
order to promote free and open discussion of these important
patent policy matters, we have also publicly released all our data and analysis at http://www.www.npedata.com.
It appears that much of the recent increase in patent lawsuit filings resulted from the joinder rule changes in the AIA.
Surprisingly, various litigation characteristics relating to Patent Holding Companies, such as the number of unique patent
holders, total number of accused infringers, and the distribution of their litigation, appear nearly unchanged from 2010. Finally, Individual Inventor lawsuits still play a role in the pa-
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tent litigation system. This may be considered as a positive and
previously unnoticed sign of the health of the patent system,
depending upon one’s views of the patent system. Further
study of the underlying patents in the disputes, including the
origination of patents asserted by Patent Holding Companies,
will be useful.
APPENDIX
To further analysis of PAEs, we report in the Appendix the
distribution of any of the particular different types of patentees
changed between 2010 and 2012. We were particularly interested in Patent Holding Companies, Individual Inventors, and
Operating Companies. To move even more granularly than
quartiles, we separated each of these types of patent holders
and then tabulated the cumulative distribution of defendants
in each category. Figures 11, 12, and 13 below report our results.
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FIGURE 11: Cumulative Distribution of Unique
Individual Patentees

FIGURE 12: Cumulative Distribution of Unique
Patent Holding Company Patentees

SCHWARTZ et al_5fmt

702

11/30/2014 3:19 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:649

FIGURE 13: Cumulative Distribution of Unique
Operating Company Patentees

Figure 10 illustrates the distribution for unique Individual
Inventor patentees in 2010 and 2012. It appears the distribution has changed slightly between those years. In 2012, there
are fewer total defendants, but the slope of the distribution is
similar. Figure 11 shows the distribution of Patent Holding
Companies in 2010 and 2012. There are slightly more defendants in 2012, but the slope of the distribution is quite similar.
However, the spacing between the points tells a slightly different story. For both Patent Holding Companies and Individual
Inventor patentees (with and without GeoTag included), patentees make up for more space between data points. These
spaces are made up for in the bottom end in 2012, causing both
years to be near equivalents overall. Put another way, the distribution is more even in 2012 than in 2010.
Figure 12 contains the distribution of Operating Companies in 2010 and 2012. The lines overlap nearly completely, indicating almost no change in the distribution between those
two years. We wonder whether the similarities between all of
these figures shows that what dominates behavior is not the
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category of plaintiff, but rather something about patent law or
litigation in general.
Turning back to the unique Individual Inventor patentees,
one company, GeoTag, was responsible for almost one third of
all accused infringers in 2010. To investigate whether we were
observing a “GeoTag effect,” in Figure 13 below we show the
cumulative distribution after excluding GeoTag. Basically,
GeoTag alone does not appear responsible for the different
slopes and configurations of the distributions. Further investigation is warranted.
FIGURE 14: Cumulative Distribution of Unique Individual Patentees (Excluding GeoTag)

